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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. JUSTIFICATION OF THE TOPIC 
Close to twelve decades ago, the German statesman Otto Von Bismarck said, “If 
there is ever another war in Europe, it will come out of some ... silly thing in the 
Balkans.”1
The Balkans has justified this prediction, as it is the region in southeastern Europe 
where three of the twentieth-century wars have erupted: the First World War in July 
1914, the war in Bosnia in 1991, and the war in Kosovo in Yugoslavia in March 1999. 
The former resulted in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire; the latter was one of the 
consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
The final results of the war in Kosovo have not been decided yet. Six years after the end 
of the bombing the Serbian province remains a UN protectorate. A combination of 
historical reasons, nationalism, failure of the state, and liberal ideas resulted in the war on 
Kosovo. The area has great historical meaning for both Serbs and Albanians. This factor, 
in combination with the suppression of the Milosevic regime and the demographic factor 
(90 percent of the population is Albanian), comprised the origins of the last conflict in 
Europe in the twentieth century. 
Although Kosovo had had autonomy status since 1974, the secessionist 
aspirations of the Kosovar Albanians caused Milosevic to withdraw this status in 1989 
and to initiate a policy of ethnic cleansing that resulted in an  international intervention in 
favor of the Kosovar Albanians. Although there were attempts for a diplomatic solution 
of the problem, Milosevic ignored them and NATO bombings begun on 24 March 1999. 
After eleven weeks, the bombings were halted with the agreement for withdrawal of 
Serbian forces and the establishment of a UN administration for supervision of the area. 
The Kosovar Albanians’ demands for an independent state were not satisfied, as the 
international community, after the end of the bombings, by UN Resolution 1244 (1999) 
turned Kosovo into a United Nations protectorate. This decision shows the complicated 
situation in the region. Although the Resolution stated “the commitment of all Member 
 
1 Rozen, Laura and Kay, and Santoro, Lara, “As a Political Rebellion Boils in the South, Banditry 
Breaks out in Albania’s North,” Christian Science Monitor, 14 Mar 1997. p.7. 
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States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia,” 
it put Kosovo under the UN’s authority.2   
This present status has caused some policy experts to conclude that “it fuels 
misplaced hopes for some in Serbia that all or part of Kosovo will again come under the 
authority of Belgrade, postpones stability in Southeast Europe, and most disturbingly, 
contributes to increase tensions, political and economic stagnation, and an unhealthy 
culture of dependence among Kosovo’s ambitious, youthful, and growing population.”3
Kosovo’s present situation is a stalemate. The security is fragile; in the area of 
governance more must be done as the democracy is weak, lacking the participation of all 
the minority groups. The economic conditions are poor with about 60% unemployment 
and an economy based on international aid. The judicial system is not yet consolidated 
and the achievement of reconciliation needs more time. Although a lot of progress has 
been made since 1999, it will take a long time to achieve the overall peaceful coexistence 
of minorities, economic prosperity, and the establishment of the rule of law. The recent 
violent events of March 2004 and the election as Prime Minister of an ex-KLA leader 
suggest that the effort for self-government is not on the right course for democracy, 
development, and reconciliation, which are not easy tasks by their nature. 
 Kosovo’s final status will determine not only its own future and course toward 
development, but also all the other Balkan countries’ stability, cooperation, and 
integration into the European structure. Most of these countries have many similarities 
with Kosovo, such as ethnic minorities and a fragile stability. All are relatively new and 
weak states with poor economic conditions and base their survival on foreign aid. 
The characterization of this status as “final” means that it must be a long-standing 
status that will lead to a self-sustaining society with all the necessary conditions for 
peaceful development, justice, and social well-being. The decision for Kosovo’s final 
status will affect all the Balkan countries, and it is probable that this decision will be an 
example for other ethnic minorities who will raise similar demands. This might cause 
rising aspirations for secession movements, the disintegration of states, and instability in 
 
2 UN Security Council Resolution 1244, para 6. 
3 Crocker, Bathsheba. Winning the Peace: Kosovo, Learning to Leverage “Liberator” Status, Ch. 212, 
p. 202. 
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the region with the possible intervention of other Balkan countries in the resulting 
conflict. Other weak states are a potential threat to international peace and security,4 
especially in such an unstable region. 
However, Kosovo has proved that it cannot survive as an independent state 
without international aid. Everyone recognizes the necessity for the international 
administration’s remaining. The international community also has recognized this 
weakness and has decided on a “standards before status” policy that requires the 
achievement of certain standards, in all the basic sectors of civil life, before the decision 
of a final status can be made. The creation of the Kosovo Standards Implementation 
Program, which determines the necessary actions for the achievement of the required 
standards in certain sectors of society both applies this policy and provides a way to 
assess the success of the current Provisional Institutions for Self-Governance (PISG).  
The criteria for state creation have changed dramatically since the nineteenth 
century.  Today the international system recognizes a state only if it has control over all 
its territory.  These twentieth-century state-creation standards reflect an international 
trend for self-determination and self-rule that has resulted in the creation of an average 
rate of 2.5 new states each year since 1945.5  
B.  THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The international community has not yet decided the final state status of Kosovo 
following the end of bombing in 1999. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
possible scenarios and the potential consequences of the final status of Kosovo according 
to an analysis of its present status, and the stability and development of the region as a 
whole. The involvement of actors with different interests, sometimes opposite, created in 
Kosovo an ambiguous and unstable situation which necessitates a long time for the 
achievement of the required standards and conditions for peace and development. 
The study is organized in five chapters: 
Chapter I is an introduction that analyzes the justification for the topic and 
explains the thesis’s organization. 
 
4 Eizenstat, Stuart E., Porter, J.E., and Weinstein, J.M.. Rebuilding Weak States: “Today however the 
gravest danger to the nation lies in the weakness of other countries,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2005, p.134. 
5 Holsti, K.J., Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics, p. 49. 
4 
Chapter II analyzes the four basic pillars—security, governance and participation, 
economic and social well being, and justice and reconciliation—of theories about 
reconstruction in post-conflict societies. 
Chapter III describes the present situation in Kosovo. It begins with a brief 
historical report for understanding the difficulties in the society today. Although a lot of 
progress has been achieved, many things remain to be done. International administration 
is the core element in reconstruction, and its longevity in Kosovo will assure the 
achievement of all the standards that have been set. 
Chapter IV describes possible scenarios for the final status of Kosovo and their 
consequences in terms of regional stability. Finally, the chapter discusses the most 
preferable scenario, one that will serve the interests of both the Albanians and the Serbs. 























                                                
II. RECONSTRUCTION OF A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY 
A.  GENERAL 
Changes in the international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War created all the necessary conditions for new conflicts. Although 
some scholars supported the idea of world peace and the “end of history,” events proved 
exactly the opposite.  The decline of tension between East and West and changes in the 
priorities of the superpowers provided an opportunity for other players within the 
international system—including the United Nations—to try to implement solutions in 
conflicts all over the world.6 Some of them were long-standing but others were new and, 
although they have historical origins, the changes in the international system created the 
conditions for the ignition of civil wars. 
The twentieth century can be characterized by three benchmarks of state-making. 
The first is 1919, the second is the end of World War II, and the third is the early-1990s.7 
Since the end of World War II, the main cause of crises and wars was the creation of 
states. Almost every group that differs from another in the same region in religion, 
culture, or language has tried to separate from the other and to create an independent 
state. The result was the wars and crises of the last decade of the twentieth century.8 
Kosovo belongs to this category. Although not an independent state, a crisis occurred 
with the Kosovar Albanians’ claims for independence after long suppression by the 
Milosevic regime and the renewal of nationalist aspiration by some Albanian leaders. 
The international intervention in 1999 was a temporary solution to this problem 
and created short-term conditions for a peaceful co-existence in the region. Thus the 
situation in the region remains fragile and the desired development after six years has not 
been achieved. In addition, a final decision about its status has not yet been made because 
of the complexity of the problem and its consequences for the region’s stability. 
 
6 Paris, Roland, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, p. 16.  
7 Holsti, p. 46. 
8 Ibid, p. 47. 
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It is easily understandable that the development and democratization of Kosovo 
will help to implement a decision about its permanent status, or, in a more optimistic 
view, the development itself will drive it to a final status. It is useful to see what theory 
mentions about the reconstruction of societies after civil wars or wars generally, and 
about the identity of the main involved actors. Theory may also help to find a reliable 
solution for all residents independent of their ethnicity. 
The application of reconstruction theory seems especially pertinent to Kosovo 
society after the significant events of the last two decades. Memories of the Milosevic era 
and the subsequent international intervention with bombings left deep marks in the minds 
of contemporary generations. The long-term goals in a reconstruction process are 
economic development, the creation of strong institutions, and the democratization of 
society, to provide the next generation with democratic rules, cooperation, and peace, and 
so that stability will return to the region. The short term should effect the peaceful 
coexistence of the different ethnicities, a sustainable security, and the creation of 
foundations for the development and democratization of Kosovo.  
“Post-conflict reconstruction” is the term often used to describe the need “for the 
rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of the society and the reconstruction of the 
enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society to include the framework of 
governance and rule of law.”9
Kosovo, although [it] is not an independent state, has all these elements 
for the reconstruction of a weak or failed state. Independently from the 
decision about its final status, a developed a[nd] democratic Kosovo with 
respect [for] all ethnicities’ human rights will [more] easily be integrated 
in[to] the western structures.  According to [the] “Democratic Peace” 
theory the democratization of society will help in the peaceful solution 
[of] differences, as democracies almost never fight each other.10   
Weaknesses in sectors like security, the provision of basic services, and respect 
for human rights and civilian freedoms are signs of a weak state11 and are often 
characteristic of a society immediately after a civil war. On the one hand, we should keep 
 
9 Orr, Robert C. Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, p. 10. 
10 Russet, Bruce. Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 1. 
11 Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein, p. 136. 
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in mind that all post-conflict societies are not the same, and it is possible that the weight 
of each influential factor will differ from case to case. Factors such as culture or religion 
might create a big difference in solving the problem. Germany after the end of World 
War II is not the same as the case of Iraq today. There are four key sectors, or pillars, on 
which to focus the reconstruction effort of a society in a post-conflict environment: 
i) security 
ii) governance and participation 
iii) social and economic well-being and, finally, 
iv) justice and reconciliation.12 
On the other hand, there are three factors that can disrupt the reconstruction 
process in a society that has just come out of a civil war: 
i) the remaining intense societal conflicts 
ii) a lack of “conflict dampeners,” including a belief in nonviolent solutions 
of disputes, and 
iii) the lack of effective governmental institutions.13 
B.  SECURITY 
Security is the first priority in the post-conflict period because of the special 
conditions—a security vacuum and internal instability—that often exist during this 
period. Although all four pillars are very important for the reconstruction of a society, 
security is the foundation for the others. It means a condition of acceptable public safety, 
especially the establishment of an environment wherein citizens can conduct daily 
business free from violence or coercion directed at them by the government, organized 
crime, political organizations, or ethnic groups.14  
Civilians may face new threats in the post-conflict period from criminals, former 
combatants, or ethnic groups. It is the state’s obligation to provide security by 
maintaining the monopoly of the use of force. A possible incapability of the state to 
provide security creates a “security vacuum” which will prevent any implementation of a 
peace agreement and the necessary economic activities of everyday life. Moreover, 
 
12 Orr, p. 11. 
13 Paris, p. 168. 
14 Ibid, p. 40. 
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political actions like the holding of elections and the establishment of a democratic 
system with political accountability are extremely difficult, if not impossible.15  
Security reforms are important for the prevention of violence after the end of the 
conflict. The main characteristics of a post-conflict society are the following: the 
presence of paramilitary forces, armed opposition, plenty of small arms, security forces 
with a political role, human rights abuses, and a lack of transparency in security affairs.16  
There are two kinds of security: security against external threats and internal 
security, both of which are critical in post-conflict periods because they define not only a 
society’s present, but also its future. These two security dimensions create the need for a 
military force (external and internal threats) and a police force (internal threats).17 We 
call the inability of a state to provide protection to its citizens against external or internal 
threats a “security gap”: it leaves space for non-state actors (criminals, armed groups) to 
exploit the situation and the state for their own profit.18
There are two major challenges regarding internal security that often determine 
the course of the peace. First, the view of former combatants about their integration into a 
new post-conflict police or armed force. If they think their security is in danger, they may 
cause problems within these new forces and thus endanger the entire peace 
implementation. Second, the creation of such conditions in public security may allow the 
resurfacing of ethnic hatreds, putting the peace-building process in danger.19
These challenges create a need for a disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration process. This three-stage process has as its basic goal the neutralization of 
former combatants in a way that ensures they will not be a danger to society, but rather, 
they will help in the establishment of peace and order. Failure in this effort will have 
long- and short-term consequences for the reconstruction of the society. The failure to 
reintegrate former combatants puts the society in danger because the existence of 
 
15 Spear, Joanna. Ending of Civil Wars: Disarmament and Demobilization, p. 141. 
16 Ball, Nicole, Ending of Civil Wars: The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies, p. 721. 
17 Orr, p. 43. 
18 Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein, p. 136. 
19 Call, T. Charles and Stanley, William. Ending of Civil Wars: Civilian Security, p. 311. 
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demobilized people creates new sources of potential danger and disorder.20 A feeling of 
security is necessary in the post-conflict period for life to return to its everyday routine. 
People need to know that they can conduct their everyday activities without the danger of 
loss of life or property.  
The main problem is that a state during the post-conflict period probably lacks the 
capacity itself to reintegrate everyone into society and begin reconstruction. Thus, such 
countries often need external help and foreign intervention to reduce the length of the 
fragile transitioning period and facilitate reconstruction. The international force must be 
able to face all the security challenges and, furthermore, to help in the creation of all the 
institutions necessary to take over management of the state after the transitioning period.  
 The “Institutionalization Before Liberalization (IBL)” strategy is an approach 
that uses a combination of cooperation among civilians and military forces for the 
establishment of security and the creation of institutions to provide basic social services 
before a liberalization process can begin.21
C.  GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION 
The next step in the reconstruction process is the establishment of government 
even though security may be not entirely achieved. This fact causes some to believe that 
governance is more important than security in the reconstruction effort. But the IBL 
strategy makes clear that strong democratic institutions are essential for further 
liberalization of the society. 
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Governance is 
the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage the country’s 
affairs at all levels and the means by which states promote social cohesion, integration, 
and ensure the well-being of their populations. It embraces all methods used to distribute 
power and manage public resources and the organizations that shape government and the 
execution of policy.”22
 
20 Orr, p. 50. 
21 Paris, p. 187. 
22 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Conflict, Peace, and Development 
Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century. 
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Crisis in governance in a weak state not only puts the state in danger, but also 
creates new sources of regional or, even worse, global threats and instability.  Elements 
such as weak political and administrative institutions, a great competition for power, the 
limited legitimacy and acceptance of political leaders, disagreement about the future 
direction of the country, and a nonparticipatory political system often characterize 
political life in a post-conflict society.23 Developed countries must have a plan for facing 
such situations. The ultimate goal is the development of the state and the integration of 
structures that will help it to avoid these kinds of danger, but they must also plan how to 
cope with the society’s immediate needs. 
The major challenge for developing or reconstructing states is the creation of 
strong institutions. As Fukuyama suggests, though scholars know a lot about state-
building, the transfer of successful institutions to weak or failed states is a sector that 
needs a lot of exploration.24 The main role of a state is the provision of basic services to 
its citizens. The failure to provide these services results in a “capacity gap” and the loss 
of citizens’ trust. Consequently, this situation leads to internal problems and, eventually, 
to the “security gap” mentioned earlier.25 Weak states are the basis for many of the 
contemporary world’s problems, such as terrorism, poverty, and AIDS.26
Both international supervision and local government are critical factors in the 
overall reconstruction process. Cooperation between them will create an effective 
government in a relatively short time. 
International aid is necessary in this effort for training and supporting effective 
self-government after the end of a conflict.  The achievement of the local government’s 
goals—such as improvement of its capabilities, broad citizen participation, representation 
of all ethnicities in both the government and the reconstruction processes, and, finally, the 
achievement of legitimacy—must be the main effort of international help.27 This task is 
 
23 Ball, p. 721. 
24 Fukuyama, Francis, State Building, pix. 
25 Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein, p. 136. 
26 Fukuyama, Francis, State Building, pix. 
27 Orr, p. 58. 
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not easy, especially in a destroyed society in which the conflict may have occurred 
because of the very lack of all these characteristics and experience in these sectors.  
Although there are no set rules for the organization of public administration, there 
are some lessons that can be learned from the United States’ experience and involvement 
in similar kinds of missions.28 Some lessons are: 
i) Money cannot buy effective governance. Successful governance 
requires the state’s provision of services to its citizens, transparency in 
its governing and decision-making procedures, and the guarantee for its 
citizens of basic human rights. 
ii) Smart strategies are needed for approaching local elites. A combination 
of incentives and sanctions is very effective in this direction, but 
simultaneous efforts must be focused on the broad participation of the 
population in the political and economic processes. 
iii) All decisions for the implementation of short-term measures must be 
made very carefully, because these may have implications for long-term 
measures.  
iv) The intervention of an international factor must be carefully determined 
and well planned for the achievement of the desired end state. In cases 
where international intervention was ill-prepared and with limited 
means, the result was worse than what existed before it.   
Local actors are as important as the international, although they have been 
underestimated in many cases. They can be not only local officials but also civil-society 
organizations. Local civil-society organizations (CSO’s) can have a critical role in peace 
implementation and, consequently, in the governance and participation of citizens in the 
political process. CSOs can better understand the post-conflict situation, know the special 
local conditions concerning religion and culture, and can help in the development of links 
between the state and local communities.29 There are also cases, however, in which CSOs 
 
28 Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein, p. 138. 
29 Predergast, John, and Plumb, Emily. Ending of Civil Wars: Building Local Capacity: From 
Implementation to Peacebuilding, p. 329. 
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played a negative role in building that link, creating competition and suspicion and thus 
increasing the prejudice against them due to opposing interests.  
Successful governance must develop and strengthen all the necessary democratic 
structures and processes that will foster participation by the greatest possible part of the 
population in political processes and, consequently, in the democratization of the society. 
This will result in a two-way relationship and influence between the government and the 
governed. 
One dimension of governance is from the top down. Government must have the 
ability to provide, protect, and preserve security, democracy, economic and social 
prosperity, and justice in society. Governments in transitioning periods like that of post-
conflict have another critical task: the creation or strengthening of institutions for the 
executive and legislative branches that will help in the good operation of the future state.  
Another dimension of governance is from the bottom up. This is a process by 
which citizens’ views and opinions are heard by the government through its democratic 
processes and mechanisms.30 The process also encourages the participation and 
representation of all opposing views. That participation is important for a democratic 
system because the basis of democracy is that the government receives its legitimacy 
from the people. In cases where a part of society does not participate in the governing 
process, there is either no democracy or it is not fully consolidated yet. The task of 
creating or strengthening democratic institutions is a big challenge, especially in societies 
where there was no democratic experience before and people are not used to democratic 
processes. Another factor that makes this task difficult is the existence of multi-ethnic 
groups and of minorities whose representation and participation is necessary in a 





30 Orr, p. 60. 
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A declaration of elections is the first step to democracy; it facilitates the transition 
to democracy and the creation of a logic of nonviolent solutions to problems. On the 
other hand, there are many other things that are needed for the consolidation of 
democracy in addition to elections.31  
D. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 
The third pillar of reconstruction is a direct result of the second, governance. 
Everyone assumes that good governance results in the well-being of the social and 
economic sectors. The challenge is how a new government can manage and balance 
external economic help and internal social conditions and tensions for the improvement 
of economic conditions in a place much destroyed and devastated by a conflict that 
occurred because of the weakness of the state.32 In societies with extensive damage to 
their economic and social infrastructures, unsustainably high defense budgets, 
environmental degradation, a weakened social fabric, and destruction of human 
resources, conflicts about ownership are common phenomena.33 In such situations, the 
necessary good governance is a separate challenge that demands a lot of effort and is 
difficult to achieve. 
In those cases there are established measures and practices for starting the process 
from conflict destruction to redevelopment: 
i) establishing a legal regulatory framework that will support the basic 
macroeconomic needs 
ii) effective management of natural resource components of many conflicts 
iii) engagement of  the private sector 
iv) jump-starting international trade 
v) establishing basic education services, and  
vi) combating HIV/AIDS.34 
Those are long-term measures for the transition to development, but the process 
also requires short-term measures for the immediate relief of residents from the conflict’s  
31 Lyons, Terrence. Ending of Civil Wars: The Role of Postsettlement Elections, p. 230. 
32 Baker, Pauline, and Weller, Angeli. An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: 
The Internal Conflict Is a Pathology of a State, The Fund for Peace, 1998, p. 12. 
33 Ball, p. 721. 
34 Orr, p. 74. 
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consequences, such as a demobilization of ex-combatants, the establishment of security 
forces under civilian control, and reform of the political and judicial systems. The effort 
to create a plan for economic recovery must be made by the international factor. The 
society must cover all short- and long-term demands, but sometimes donors’ priorities 
differ from those of the devastated society.35 A combination of humanitarian relief 
programs and plans for long-term development is the best approach to reconstruction of 
such a society.36 It is very difficult for a local government to face all these challenges at 
the same time, especially when there are threats for the residents which have not yet been 
faced. The difficulties for efficient governance during the first period immediately after 
the end of war are tremendous, and this makes achieving economic recovery and social 
well-being even more difficult. For this reason, the commitment of the international 
factor in reconstruction is essential to the reduction of poverty and economic 
improvement.   
Achievement of all these goals depends on three parameters that international 
donors must recognize: a) the type of help that is needed, b) to whom this help should be 
given, and c) with what conditions.37
The type of help depends on three factors/dilemmas that are relative to the 
timetable of help and the goals of help: 
i) timely implementation versus capacity building, 
ii) current expenditure versus capacity building, and 
iii) elite pacification versus egalitarian growth. 
The issue of the final destination of aid is critical and requires that international 
donors know and understand the balance of powers in the post-conflict society. If aid 
goes to the wrong hands, it may create new tensions instead of peace and the failure of 
the reconstruction process.  
 
35 Boyce, K. James. Beyond Good Intentions: External Assistance and Peace Building, p. 369. 
36 Orr, p. 85. 
37 Boyce, p. 369. 
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            Other parameters that donors must keep in mind are the current conditions in the 
society and the long-term task of democratization of the population. There are three ways 
to help in the achievement of this goal: 
i) financing and strengthening the democratic institutions, 
ii) providing assistance in the mobilization of domestic resources, and 
iii) ensuring that the economic gains from the above mobilization will be used 
for the reduction of inequalities in the society. 
The conditions under which aid is given must also support the goals of the 
society’s reconstruction. In regard to its macroeconomic policy, there are, again, short- 
and long-run goals. The former is macroeconomic stabilization. The latter involves 
appropriate adjustments in the economic structure for the development of the society, 
peace-building, and consolidation of a democracy. 
In Kosovo in the second half of the 1990s, international donors initiated efforts to 
improve the results of financing activities in the peace-implementation process. They 
added new economic instruments for elections and police reform, in addition to efforts 
for more flexible IMF restrictions. But results were not as desired. As J. Boyce and M. 
Pastor write, “unless the peace process is allowed to reshape economic policy, both will 
fail.”38 Rethinking and a collaborative redesign of the political and economic aspects are 
necessary for an effective peace strategy. This could come from lessons learned from 
previous peace missions, which included: 
i) Impact assessments, 
ii) Institution-building and strengthening of the public sector, 
iii) Emphasis on employment from the early stages of the reconstruction 
process, 
iv) Use of political influence of sovereign lending on the peace process, and 
v) Recognizing the economic distortions introduced by the international 
presence.39 
 
38 Krisna, Kumar, ed. Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance, 
p. 287. 
39 Woodward, Susan. Ending of Civil Wars: Economic Priorities for Successful Peace 
Implementations, p. 199. 
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International aid must be focused in measures for jump-starting the domestic 
economy and the restoration of social capital, thereby avoiding the danger of starting new 
conflicts. Tasks such as poverty reduction, human security, and the strengthening of 
democratic institutions will help to promote economic growth and the spread of 
democracy to places where different kinds of threats (nationalism, religious, or criminals) 
may endanger regional stability.40  
E.  JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 
The establishment of the rule of law in a society that has just come out of a war is 
a very important part of the reconstruction process. The last but not least pillar of 
reconstruction is justice and reconciliation. It is critical for the success of all the other 
pillars because, if this aspect fails, the entire process is in danger. It is very difficult to 
convince people to live together and forget or reconcile with others with whom they were 
fighting. Probably each one has killed relatives or friends of the other.  
The importance of establishing the rule of law prevails in these comments: “As in 
Bosnia, so in Iraq, everything depends on the early establishment of the rule of law: A 
functioning economy, a free and fair political system, the development of civil society, 
public confidence in police and courts. The process is sequential … In Bosnia and 
Kosovo we paid a bitter price for not establishing the rule of law early. It is not a mistake 
we should repeat in Baghdad.”41  
There are four critical activities in post-conflict reconstruction that must take 
place in society for the imposition of justice: 
i) The establishment of emergency justice measures by international actors 
for filling the “justice gap” until the development of domestic processes 
and institutions are able to take over, 
ii) Efforts for the establishment of a long-term indigenous judicial system, 
iii) Development and establishment of mechanisms (international and 
domestic) for addressing injustices and atrocities from the past, and 
 
40 Orr, p. 85. 
41 Ashdown, Paddy, High Representative for Bosnia and Hergegovina, 22 Apr 2003. 
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iv) Establishment of pre-deployment enablers which should be in place in 
advance to facilitate a rapid and effective international response.42  
These activities aim at six key sectors of justice and reconciliation: a) effective 
law-enforcement instruments, responsive to civilian authorities and respectful of human 
rights, b) an impartial, open, and accountable judicial system, c) a fair constitution and 
body of law, d) mechanisms for monitoring and upholding human rights, e) a humane 
correction system, and f) formal and informal reconciliation systems for dealing with past 
abuses and for resolving grievances arising from the conflict.43
Although justice and reconciliation are different, almost opposite, they serve the 
same purpose. Both address past and current injustices and wrongdoings. The 
achievement of a peaceful future and the credibility of and respect for a new government 
in a society that has just come out of war and its democratization can be reached only by 
successfully addressing justice and reconciliation. In practice two basic questions are 
raised:44
First, what should be done with people who have committed crimes during the 
conflict period? There two schools of thought. One believes that criminals must be 
punished, for two reasons: The deterrence of future crimes and as psychological support 
for victims. Victim and perpetrator are not able to live together until the crimes are 
published and justice is imposed on the perpetrators. Another school believes an 
opposing argument which is the need to forget all the things and events that divided the 
two communities. 
Second, what can be done? This is the practical answer to the first question and 
lies somewhere in the middle of the opinions mentioned above, because there are great 
difficulties in the imposition of justice.  
There is always a danger of igniting greater violence if the justice program 
touches important members of either side. If a settlement is the result of negotiations, 
then it is most probable that the leaders of both sides have already guaranteed immunity 
 
42 Orr, p. 91. 
43 Orr, p. 90. 
44 Licklider, Roy. Obstacles to Peace Settlements, p. 711. 
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for themselves and their supporters.45 There are cases where the number of people 
involved in crimes is so big that it is impossible for the judicial system to handle all the 
cases, as happened in the Rwanda genocide. 
As is the case with economic well-being, the involvement of the international 
factor is also important in the development of a trustworthy justice system. The absence 
of a consistent justice system and sufficient mechanisms for reconciliation put in danger 
the entire reconstruction process.46 The basis for these must be domestic laws, practices, 
and institutions. The strengthening and training of local actors for building a reliable 
justice system and respect for human rights must be the first priority of international aid. 
This task has many times ended in failure because of the inability of international 
organizations to apply different policies than those they apply in stable societies.47  
The desired task of peace, with respect to human rights, in a post-conflict society 
demands well-planned actions to balance the different tensions. However, the 
international community is not a single actor. Although everyone may agree with the 
general goal, there are many differences in the details of an implementation of a specific 
program.48
First, the international actors must compromise the objectively desired elements 
of peace implementation with the intentions of the different parties that will take part in 
peace implementation. Second, they must find a balance between the desired goals and 
the limited resources provided. Third, international actors must balance the tension 
between their oversight role and the demands of effective peace-building. Finally, 
human-rights actors must balance the needs of a fragile post-conflict society and their 





45 Licklider, Roy. Obstacles to Peace Settlements, p. 712. 
46 Licklider, p. 93. 
47 Putnam, Tonya L. Ending of Civil Wars: Human Rights and Sustainable Peace, p. 237. 
48 Licklider, p. 714. 
49 Ibid, p. 260. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a society destroyed by a war needs both short- and long-term 
measures for the reconstruction of its basic sectors. Although this theory is well known, 
its application is difficult because of the need of coordination and implementation of so 
many activities in the various sectors of security, governance, the economy, and justice. 
Other factors that must be taken into consideration are the environment and the existing 
conditions in the area that make the entire project more difficult. 
The role of the international factor is critical because, in the first steps of a society 
toward a more peaceful and democratized route, there are many traps. Many domestic 
actors will have lost their privileges and are potential threats in the course of 
reconstruction. Only the devoted guidance of experienced countries will help the post-
conflict society be integrated into Western structures and lead it to democracy and 
development. Coordination among all the international actors is very important.  
According to Karin von Hippel, there are five actors that need to be coordinated: donor 
governments, militaries, multilateral organizations, the private sector, and 
nongovernmental organizations.50
The four pillars of reconstruction are the critical sectors on which the local and 
international actors need to be focused for the most rapid possible reconstruction of the 
society and creation of conditions for peace, justice, and development. The challenge 
demands an enormous amount of effort, budget, coordination, and time for a satisfactory 
result. Most of the data till now shows that there are more cases of failure than of success, 


































                                                
III. PRESENT SITUATION IN KOSOVO 
A. BRIEF HISTORY 
The Kosovo issue is a matter of perspective concerning the relationship between 
nationalism and statehood. Its history reflects centuries of conflicting ethnic myths and 
nationalist aspirations. The catalyst in this process was the modern idea that every state 
must be homogeneous.51 In Europe, nations existed long before the creation of states. 
The basic component of the doctrine of self-determination is that states must be based on 
nations.52  The nation-state is the main idea today in the international system. Although 
there have been efforts for alternative ideas, like communism’s transnational brotherhood 
or the race of Nazism, none of them has challenged successfully the idea of the 
Westphalian state.53  The idea of national self-determination provides legitimacy to the 
dominance of the nation-state as the universal political form. This idea has created a 
demand for independence by many ethnic groups and caused the creation of more than 
140 new states since 1945.54 The idea of self-determination has changed from a political 
preference to a human right55 and the idea that the self-ruling state is the “natural” 
political organization. In the Balkans, where there are many nations and the borders 
include many ethnic minorities, aspirations were raised for the creation of Greater 
Croatia, Greater Albania, and Serbia. 
M. Djilas wrote: “wipe away Kosovo from the Serb mind and soul and we are no 
more. If there had been no battle at Kosovo, the Serbs would have invented it for its 
suffering and heroism.” Kosovo is a Serbian province with great importance for both 
Serbs and Albanians. The battle of Kosova Polje (the Field of Blackbirds) in 1389, in 
which the Serbs were defeated by the Ottomans, gave Kosovo special meaning for Serbs, 
who saw it as the birthplace of the Serb nation. The region also has economic importance 
 
51 Paxton, Robert. Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 668. 
52 Holsti, p. 52. 
53 Ibid, p. 50. 
54 Ibid, p. 54. 
55 Ibid, p. 52. 
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as it is rich in various minerals.56 Finally, it has strategic importance for Serbia because 
of its mountains border with Albania which, in case of conflict, forms a natural barrier 
between the two countries. 
However, Kosovo is also important to the Albanians. The Albanian national 
movement was born there in 1878,57 and, for that reason, it is considered the center of 
Albanian nationalism.58  
The population in Kosovo, according to the 1991 census, consists of Albanians 
(82.2%), Serbs (9.9%), Montenegrins (1%), Gypsies (Roma 2.2%), Muslims (2.9%), and 
other minorities (1.6%).59
After the First World War about half a million Albanians were forcibly 
incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Since then, there have 
been eight phases in the relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo:60
i) 1918–1941: The Albanian minority had no rights and an imported 
Serbian elite governed the region. 
ii) 1941–1945: Under Italian rule, part of Kosovo was united with Albania. 
Because of the collaboration of Albanians with Germans and Italians in 
Kosovo, they were opposed by a Slav resistance. 
iii) 1945–1966: There was an improvement in relations between the two 
communities and, from the armed conflict, they tried to find a political 
resolution. 
iv) 1967–1981: The rights of Albanians were acknowledged and respected. 
In 1974 the government of former Yugoslavia recognized Kosovo as a 
province with autonomous status. 
 
56 Smith, M.A.. Kosovo: Background and Chronology: In the region there are 50% of all known nickel 
deposits of Former Yugoslavia, 48% of lead and zinc, 47% of magnesium, 36% of lignite, and 32,4% of 
kaolin deposits. 
57 Babuna, Aydin. The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic identity superseding. Albanians 
were the last nation in the Balkans to develop the sense of nationalism, which was marked by the 
establishment of the Priznen League in 1878, Nationalities Papers, Abigdon: Mar 2000, Vol. 28, Iss. 1, p. 
67. 
58 Smith, p. 1. 
59 Judah, Tim. The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Appendix 5: Population 
of Kosovo 1948–91, p. 345. 
60 Ibid, p. 2. 
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v) 1981–1991: Albanian assertiveness resulted in the riots of 1981 and 
1982. Serbia sought to re-establish its domination in Kosovo and 
Albanians responded by declaring the independence of the region.61 
vi) 1991–1995: The Serbs flooded Kosovo with security forces and the 
Albanians created a parallel state. Their leader, Rugova, supported the 
nonviolent resistance. 
vii) 1996–March 1999: An era of violent resistance against Serbian rule. 
Disappointed by the Dayton settlement, they initiated an armed struggle. 
They created an armed separatist group, the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA), and began a guerrilla campaign for Kosovo’s independence.62 
The Serb’s response was to begin the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. The 
intervention of the international community by the Rambouillet 
Agreement was rejected by the Serbs. The consequence was NATO 
bombings.63 
viii) March 1999–Today: The Serbian response to the bombings was the 
escalation of the ethnic-cleansing process. The result was a new wave of 
refugees into FYROM, Albania, and Montenegro.64 After eleven weeks 
of bombings Milosevic agreed to withdraw Serbian Forces from 
Kosovo. United Nation Security Council Resolution 1244 decided the 
deployment of a peace-enforcement mission in Kosovo (UNMIK and 




61 Report on Eastern Europe. On 2 July 1990 the Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo’s equality in 
status to other Republics of Yugoslavia, 27 Jul 1990, p. 45. 
62 Paris, p. 213. 
63 Peace Operations can be established in two ways: First, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (after 
the negotiated consent of the parties), and second, under Chapter VII, which permits the overriding of a 
domestic jurisdiction (Article 2-7) without consent of local parties. 
64 Smith, M.A., p. 6. 
65 UN Security Council Resolution 1244: “Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United 
Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as 
required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to such presences.”  
UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) is the civilian part of the peacekeeping mission and KFOR (Kosovo 
Force) is the military NATO-led part of the mission. 
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B. SIX YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF KOSOVO 
The main points of Resolution 1244 were: a) the displacement of FRY 
sovereignty from Kosovo, b) its replacement by UN and NATO forces, c) the 
establishment of autonomy and democratic self-governance, d) facilitating a political 
process for the determination of Kosovo’s final status, taking into account the 
Rambouillet records, and e) preparing the supervision of “the transfer of authority from 
Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under the political 
settlement.”66  
From the first moment of the deployment of international administrators, both 
UNMIK and KFOR were focused on establishing security, the construction of strong 
governmental institutions, and the establishment of a liberal process.67 International 
officials were responsible for the basic administrative actions and the demilitarization of 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), so the region became a UN protectorate.68 The 
special representative of the UN Secretary General assumed “all … executive authority 
with respect to Kosovo,” including the right to appoint or dismiss “any person to perform 
functions in the civil administration of Kosovo including judiciary.” Under his 
supervision, civilian services were divided among the United Nations, the European 
Union, and the OSCE.  The United Nations assumed jurisdiction over the public 
administration, the police, and judicial affairs. The OSCE has the task of creating new 
political institutions, training local administrators, and organizing elections. Finally, the 
European Union was responsible for the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and 
the development of a market-based economy and a banking system.69  
Although the achievements of the UN administration and security forces were 
considerable  and  a  lot  of  progress  was made, it did not reach the desired level (as was  
 
 
66 UNSCR 1244. 
67 Robertson, Lord of Port Ellen. Kosovo One Year On: Achievements and Challenges indicated five 
main challenges for NATO: “Deterring renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb 
forces, establishing secure environment and ensuring public safety and order, demilitarizing KLA, 
supporting the international humanitarian effort, and coordinating with and supporting the international 
civil presence, the UNMIK,” 21 Mar 2000. 
68 Paris, p. 213. 
69 Ibid, p. 214. 
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evident in March 2004), because of many factors: slow deployment of the required 
forces, the lack of a democratic tradition, the society’s condition since 1990, and the 
polarization of the society.70  
In reference to the sector of security, it was decided to deploy civil and security 
forces to supervise peace efforts, public safety, freedom of movement, and the safe return 
of refugees and displaced persons. Additionally, the United Nations demanded the 
withdrawal of all Serbian forces, the immediate end of violence, and the disarmament and 
demilitarization of the KLA and the remaining Albanian groups. Moreover, an agreement 
was reached for the return of a certain number of Serb military and police after the 
completion of withdrawal of the Serb forces.71  
In practice, the security task was much more difficult, with poor results, 
especially in the first year. In his report of June 6, 2000, Secretary General Annan noted 
that: “The general security situation in Kosovo has not changed significantly. Members 
of minority communities continued to be victims of intimidation, assaults, and threats 
throughout Kosovo.”72 Before the war, approximately 200,000 Serbs lived in Kosovo. In 
the summer of 1999, only half were left. The situation remained insecure for all 
minorities, and the future for a multiethnic society does not permit great expectations.73 
Another factor that aggravated this situation was the slow development of international 
policemen. In June 2000, a speedy deployment of 3,000 policemen was expected for the 
first two months that KFOR was responsible for law enforcement.  In August 2000, the 
first policemen arrived, and it took four months for the deployment of 1,400 policemen. 
A year after the end of bombing, only 77 percent of the authorized strength had been 
deployed.74 The deployment of all the policemen was a great challenge: many countries 
sent unprepared or ill-equipped policemen; the constitution of some countries did not 
allow such deployment. 
 
70 Pekmez, Juan. The Intervention by the International Community and the Rehabilitation of Kosovo, 
p. 20. 
71 UNSCR 1244, para 4,  p. 2. 
72 Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, 6 Jun 
2000. 
73 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, p. 110. 
74 Ibid, p. 111. 
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The demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army proved an easier task for 
UNMIK because the transformation of the KLA to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), 
an unarmed civil relief organization,75 helped individual KLA members join a civil 
agency. That task was completed by September 1999. A demobilization of opposing 
soldiers and their integration into civil society is a most important goal in the peace 
implementation process.76 But the process has a downside, as was evident in the March 
2004 events. According to reports, some members of the KPC did not protect the 
threatened people, especially Serbs. 
In governance and participation, a special representative of  the Secretary General 
was appointed to control the implementation of the international civil presence in order to 
satisfy the provision of an interim autonomous administration. He has the power to 
appoint or dismiss Albanians officials and to decide about the appliance of laws. The 
long-term goal is the creation of democratic institutions with representation of all 
minorities. This is intended to guarantee a peaceful life and coexistence for all people in 
Kosovo. Failure to achieve this goal could create another weak or failed state in Europe 
with serious consequences for the Balkans’ stability. And the loss of legitimacy of 
Kosovo’s self-government for part of its society might well create the same problems as 
those in the former Yugoslavia. Kosovo’s Serbs boycotted the recent elections, denying 
recognition of the elected government. This possibility magnifies the importance of 
participation by all minorities in the political process. It is for that reason that the Institute 
for Civil Administration was created for the training of personnel in the public sector. 
The Kosovo Transition Council has a consultative and advisory role in the long-term task 
of improving the peace-making process. 
The passing of all judicial and legislative authorities to the special representative 
of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) gave him the power to dismantle the parallel 
structures of self-government that were established by the KLA, not an easy as the 
UNMIK was understaffed in the beginning and the KLA structures had deep roots.77
 
75 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last accessed 14 Mar 2005, from 
http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/objectives.htm 
76 Stedman, Stephen J. Turbulent Peace: International Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil 
War, p. 746. 
77 Ibid, p. 115. 
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The creation of a Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) in January 2000 
was a first step toward sharing responsibilities in the provisional administration with 
representatives from all spectrums of society.78 The JIAS is divided into three political 
structures at the provincial level: 
i) The Interim Administrative Council (IAC): an executive board that acts 
as the highest decision-making body. The SRSG is the chief executive, 
with four UNMIK and four local members on the council. 
ii) Twenty administrative departments, referred to as ministries, ranging 
from justice to civil security, are co-run by UNMIK and local officials. 
iii) A new governmental system under which the municipal elections in 
October 2000 were conducted. 
The elections helped in the transformation of former paramilitary organizations 
into legitimate political parties.  In this way the international community integrated the 
paramilitary organizations into the political process and demonstrated the logic of 
nonviolent solutions to problems.79  The OSCE mission in Kosovo (OMIK) has 
conducted four elections since 1999: the Municipal Assembly in 2000 and 2002 and the 
Kosovo Assembly in 2001 and 2004. The last elections, in October 2004, were critical 
because the responsibility for their conduction was handed over to domestic election- 
management institutions. 
Although the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in 1999 called for the 
creation of a constitutional framework for Kosovo’s governance, it was May 2001 when 
UNMIK finally promulgated it.80 The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
(PISG) were elected in November 2001. The PISG has 120 seats: election by popular 
vote fills 100 seats, 10 seats are reserved for Serb representatives, and 10 seats are for 
representatives of other minority groups, including Roma, Ashkalia, Turks, Goranis, 
Egyptians, and Bosnians.81 It governs according to the principles of UNSCR 1244 and 
 
78 Stedman, p. 115. 
79 Williams, Paul. The Road to Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status, p. 414. 
80 Ibid, p. 416. 
81 Military Review. Kosovo Present and Future, Nov–Dec 2003. 
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the Constitutional Framework,82 a document that gives the PISG substantial autonomy. 
UNMIK has the right to make decisions in issues pertaining to the economy, law 
enforcement and security, foreign affairs, and the return of displaced people. During 2003 
many responsibilities were transferred to the PISG, but UNMIK kept power over issues 
of state sovereignty, justice, security, and foreign affairs.83  
The “Institutionalization Before Liberalization” (IBL) strategy is an approach to 
the reconstruction of governance which facilitates the development of a society. It is an 
improved version of the rapid-liberalization strategy used in the early 1990s. It has the 
same goals for achieving liberalization, but uses a more controlled liberalization process 
combined with the simultaneous development of institutions capable of dealing with the 
destabilizing factors of society.84 The international community chose a “standards before 
status” policy, a kind of “institutionalization before liberalization” strategy that forces the 
Provisional Institutions for Self-Government to achieve certain standards before making 
the final decision about Kosovo’s status.85 Another option was a “status with standards” 
policy by which the political process would be advanced while at the same time 
implementing standards. The “standards before status” policy was chosen as most 
appropriate for the development of Kosovo,86 and was reaffirmed in a meeting of the UN 
Security Council after the violent events of last March.87 The plan outlining “Standards 
for Kosovo”88 had been created and presented by UNMIK on 10 December 2003 in 
Pristine and was subsequently endorsed by the Security Council in its statement of 12 
December. This plan remains the desired target of Kosovo society. In it are set out the 
appropriate standards for every aspect of life that is necessary for the recovery of a war-
torn society. The sectors included are: a) functioning democratic institutions b) the rule of 
 
82 UNMIK/PR/1078. Standards for Kosovo. 10 Dec 2003. 
83 U.S. Department of State. Kosovo. Last accessed 14 Mar 2005, from 
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law, c) freedom of movement, d) the sustainable return and the rights of communities and 
their members, e) the economy, f) property rights, g) dialogue, and h) the Kosovo 
Protection Corps. These aspects comprise the more detailed sectors of the four pillars of 
reconstruction of a post-conflict society. 
The violent events of March 2004 affected the whole reconstruction process. 
Physical infrastructure was destroyed, a new wave of displaced people created, some 
media proved irresponsible, the international and domestic security forces failed in their 
mission, and the ethnic Albanian leadership had a very weak response to the violence. 
One direct consequence was the Serbian boycotting of Kosovo Assembly elections in 
October 2004, as had been feared, and their refusal to recognize the elected government 
as the legitimate government of the region. The elections were critical for the future of 
democracy in Kosovo as the responsibility for their conduct was handed over to domestic 
election-management institutions.89
Another setback in governance was the election of an ex-KLA leader, Ramush 
Haradinaj, as Kosovo’s Prime Minister,90 a factor that did not support the participation of 
all minorities in the political process. Moreover, that choice will not help the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government prove that they are trying to create a peaceful multi-
ethnic society.91
To promote economic and social well-being, it was decided to provide 
humanitarian relief for the residents, to create the necessary support infrastructure, and to 
promote respect for human rights,  the return of all displaced people, and the initiatives of 
 
89 Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. Last accessed 14 Mar 2005, from 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ 
90 “Ramush Haradinaj, a former guerrilla leader, was questioned by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia only a couple of weeks before he was picked to lead Kosovo's 
government, and he may soon be indicted for war crimes.” “A Poor Choice in Kosovo,” The New York 
Times, 24 Dec 2004. 
91 Ibid, “The United Nations may have been unduly optimistic on the future of the Kosovo talks. But if 
there is to be any chance of bringing the Albanians and Serbs together, both the Kosovars and the United 
Nations have to understand that putting people like Mr. Haradinaj forward as their leaders only sets the 
clock  back.”  
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the EU (with the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe)92  and 
other international organizations to develop economic activities in the region for 
economic prosperity and stability.  
When the UN arrived in Kosovo they found: “Empty streets. Shattered shops, no 
water, no work … Murders in open streets. Dead bodies and piles of garbage…. No one 
in charge.”93 Since June 1999, there has been great improvement in these areas as the 
physical infrastructure has been repaired, postal service restored, schools repaired, and 
well-equipped agricultural activities restarted. But much more must be done. The 
uncertainty in Kosovo’s political status discourages international investment, so the 
economy remains underdeveloped. Unemployment remains at a high level (about 50 
percent, the highest in Europe), corruption and the black market are flourishing. Most of 
the young people want to leave the region. Their only alternative is to stay and follow the 
nationalistic road of their parents.94 Peace in the region depends on economic prosperity. 
For that reason, international funds and a UN reconstruction effort are needed. This is 
another significant factor that must be taken into consideration in the decision of 
Kosovo’s final status.  
Finally, in the areas of justice and reconciliation, it was decided to allow the 
return of all refugees and displaced people and create a multi-ethnic society. Most of the 
refugees from Serb operations returned after the arrival of KFOR, but the Serb refugees 
who left with the Serbian forces remain in Serbia and Montenegro.  The UN Special 
Representative, Bernard Kouchner, reported in July 2000, one year after the end of the 
bombings: “[they] still hate one another deeply … To make peace takes generations, a 
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deep movement and a change of a spirit.”95 The violent events of March 2004 proved that 
fulfilling the vision of a multi-ethnic society needs much effort and has a long way to go. 
The establishment of a judicial administration was also one of the great challenges 
for UNMIK. The increase of both ordinary crimes and war crimes was a great obstacle 
for the judicial process, although by February 2000 more than 400 judges and prosecutors 
had been sworn in. The appointment of foreign judges was slower and in September 2000 
only six judges and two prosecutors had been deployed. The judicial system had also to 
face the problem of which laws to apply. Resolution 1244 does not specify the law that 
should be applied in the region. In the beginning UNMIK applied the Serbian law, but 
after protests from Kosovar Albanians, UNMIK applied the law that existed before 
1989.96
The violence of March 2004 and the election as Prime Minister of an ex-leader of 
the KLA, Ramush Haradinaj, proved that reconciliation needs more time and effort from 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and the entire society. 
Every year a Security Council mission of UN officials visits Kosovo and reports 
the progress achieved by UNMIK and KFOR in the sectors of security, the return of 
refugees, reconciliation, and the institutionalization of the region.97 The reports mention 
the progress of Kosovo society in all aspects of everyday life, but still, at the end of every 
report, it is mentioned that there is a long way to go to achieve the desired democratized 
society.  
The violent events that suddenly erupted in March of 2004 were a great setback in 
the reconstruction process. At about 8 p.m. on March 15, unknown attackers fired from a 
car at an eighteen-year-old Serb, Jovica Ivic, in the Serb village of Caglavica on the 
outskirts of Pristina.98 Serbs blockaded the main Pristina-Skopje highway, an economic 
lifeline for Kosovo. On March 16, 2004, the so-called “war associations”—three 
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interconnected organizations representing the KLA’s war veterans, KLA invalids, and the 
families of the missing—organized widespread demonstrations in almost every Albanian 
city in Kosovo to protest the arrest and detention of former KLA leaders on domestic and 
international war-crime charges.99 On March 17, serious disorders occurred in Kosovo 
because of the combination of all the above events and the irresponsible role of some 
media which reported the drowning by Serbs of three young Albanians.100 Security 
forces in Kosovo (UNMIK, KFOR, KPC) lost control of the situation for about forty-
eight hours and were not able to protect the threatened population from the rage of the 
mob.  The results of the violence were twenty dead and nearly 900 injured, and 
approximately 900 Serb, Ashkali, and Roma homes, and up to ten public buildings, thirty 
Serbian churches, and two monasteries damaged or destroyed. Roughly 4,500 people 
were displaced.101
The most worrying aspect of the violence was the ethnic Albanian leaders’ 
attitude. Their weak response and the avoidance of condemnation of the violence 
constitute a sign that the reconciliation is not on a good route. Although some 
announcements that condemned the violence were made, none of them referred to Serbs. 
The response of Kosovo’s President Ibrahim Rugova repeatedly failed to condemn 
attacks against Serbs and other minorities, and made only passive statements of concern 
about the stopping of violence.102 In his statement the following day he expressed his 
“deepest regret” for the wounding of a UNMIK police officer and KFOR soldiers, but 
made no mention of Serb victims. 
The Kosovo Parliamentary Assembly’s (the province’s parliament and part of the 
PISG) response on the first day was suspension of its work. The Assembly remained 
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passive and issued a public statement that blamed the international community and the 
Serbs for the violence: “The Kosovo Assembly voices its disagreement with the lack of 
commitment by UNMIK to provide security for all Kosovar citizens. The tolerance for 
Serb parallel structures and criminal gangs that murder Kosovar citizens is a wrong 
policy that will destabilize Kosovo.”103  
The Kosovo Democratic Party in its statement blamed Serbs and justified the use 
of violence as a means of differences’ solution: “Serbs are misusing the Albanians’ 
goodwill to create an equal society for all. They don’t want to integrate in Kosovar 
society. Proof of this is yesterday’s [children’s drowning] and today’s [Mitrovica 
violence] events. Their will has remained in the previous five years only for violence 
against Albanians. This can no longer be tolerated.”104
On the other hand, there were some exceptions. Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi 
went personally to Caglavica, accompanied by several other ethnic Albanian leaders, and 
convinced the crowd to go home within minutes, after promising that the Serb roadblock 
would be removed. Rexhepi had also gone to Mitrovica on March 17 in an attempt to 
calm the situation, with less success. In Decani on March 18, the municipality head, 
Ibrahim Selmanaj, and the head of the local branch of the KLA Veterans Association, 
Avdyl Mushkolaj, personally stopped a crowd that was moving toward the historic 
Decani Monastery, intending to burn it down.105
UNMIK and KFOR also proved incapable of stopping or protecting the minorities 
in these events.106 Moreover, the response of international actors was to increase the  
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presence of the Contact Group in the region. Its representatives, beginning in April 2004, 
met every six weeks in Pristine to monitor the situation and make clear their support for 
UNMIK and KFOR.107
The consequences of all this violence was a return to previous years—the 
immediate need for reconstruction of physical infrastructure, the establishment of the ule 
of law and its public respect, the prosecution of perpetrators, and the return of all 
displaced people—but also a deeper polarization within the society. These events also 
proved that although a lot of progress had been achieved since 1999, the results from the 
efforts for that multi-ethnic society are not encouraging. And the situation remains fragile 
and relatively unstable.108 Moreover, it is obvious that some ethnic Albanians leaders do 
not want reconciliation; after five years UNMIK and KFOR were still unable to protect 
the threatened minorities.109  
At the end of March 2004, the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (KSIP) 
was created to indicate the proper policies and actions that are needed for the 
implementation of the program “Standards for Kosovo.”110 The plan covers all the 
sensitive sectors of society and all the necessary actions needed for the future. According 
to the “standards before status” strategy, the PISG needs to have a more active role in the 
sectors of justice, governance, freedom of movement, and the return of displaced people 
for the achievement of those standards. 
Since March 2004 the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government has made some 
progress in the reconstruction of damaged or destroyed property, inter-ethnic 
reconciliation, and reform of local government.  The signing of a joint declaration by 
Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb leaders on 14 July 2004—in which they collectively 
commit to completing the reconstruction of houses damaged in the violence before the 
onset of the winter and give renewed impetus to the return of internally displaced persons 
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(IDPs)—is a significant development, but it needs to be followed up with concrete and 
timely action, as nearly 2,400 people remain displaced.111 The setting of a timetable for 
the standards’ implementation is not an easy task because of the limited success which 
has been achieved so far. The present situation forces all the involved actors to try harder 
for the achievement of the desired standards, but, on the other hand, the multi-ethnic 
society in Kosovo is very unstable, as was proved by the March 2004 violent events.  
The present situation has reached a stalemate and new initiatives are needed for 
solving the problem. Any initiative from international actors without the good intentions 
of Belgrade and Pristine will be without meaning. An approach and dialogue are 
necessary between Belgrade and Pristine for the improvement of the social conditions in 
Kosovo. The election of the former ethnic Albanian rebel commander Ramush 
Haradinaj112 as Kosovo’s prime minister will not help in this direction.113
Kosovo is a UN protectorate, and Albanians leaders, although they seem to like 
this situation, prefer complete independence, and they are moving in that direction. On 
the other hand, that is opposite to Resolution 1244,114 and no one Serb leader can accept 
it now. The United Nations’ administration seems to be trying to delay the final decision 
for Kosovo’s political status. The policy “standards before status” advocates this delay. 
The standards described in “Standards for Kosovo” are so high that it will take a long 
time for their achievement. And the recent violent events and the boycotting of October’s 
elections proved that much more time is needed for the peaceful coexistence, the 
economic development, and the democratization of Kosovo. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Kosovo crisis has its roots not only in historic and nationalistic 
reasons but also in the failure of the state and the loss of its legitimacy. The change in the 
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international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union advocated the spread of 
conflicts. The international intervention in Kosovo was a temporary solution for the 
region that provided humanitarian relief to Kosovar Albanians in the beginning and 
protection to other minorities afterward. It also established the basis for a developed 
society: a transitional authority (international and domestic) established for the 
achievement of a sustainable peace.115 Its long-term goal is the creation of a democratic, 
self-governed society in which human rights will be respected, with justice and economic 
development capable to be integrated into Western structures.  
The present situation as proved last March is fragile and relatively unstable. It 
needs more time, effort, and commitment, especially from the PISG, for the achievement 
of all the standards mentioned in “Standards for Kosovo.” Six years after the end of the 
bombing the release of the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan describes the desired 
actions for the achievement of a certain level of quality of life. The security is fragile and 
the political situation is on a good route, but the participation is not. After the Serb 
boycotting of the last elections, the multi-ethnic society faces many problems, and 
memories from the past are alive. In the economic sector there is a high percentage of 
unemployment and the economy needs international funds to survive. It is not self-
sustaining and, consequently, there is instability and obligations for the international 
administrators for a long deployment in Kosovo. The judicial administration needs more 
time, as there is mistrust between the judges and the defendants. Reconciliation is not 
possible, at least for this generation, and the election of an ex-KLA member as Prime 
Minister will not help in reconciliation. No one can or wants to forget the past. A self-
sustained society is not yet possible. Only development, democratization, and time will 
help in the achievement of this goal. Another option for achievement of those goals is an  
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IV. SCENARIOS FOR THE FINAL STATUS OF KOSOVO AND 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY 
A. GENERAL 
Six years after the end of the bombing, the remaining undecided status in Kosovo 
and the ambiguity of Resolution 1244 suggest what many must have known from the first 
moment—that there is no easy solution for the region’s problems.  The final status of 
Kosovo is the independent variable to this problem, and the Balkans’ stability the 
dependent. In this chapter I will describe some scenarios in an effort to cover the entire 
spectrum of solutions, from full independence for Kosovo to a return to the status extant 
before March 1999. Each possible final decision will be examined regarding its 
implications in the Balkans’ fragile stability, because the consequences will influence 
neighboring countries with similar problems (underdevelopment, secession movements, 
and weak states) and multi-ethnic societies. 
The current situation in Kosovo is a stalemate. The moment for a decision on 
Kosovo’s final political status is far away, as was shown by the violent events in March 
2004. The combination of historical and nationalistic reasons for the failure of the state of 
the former Yugoslavia created a situation in which the reconciliation and peaceful 
coexistence of Albanians with the other Kosovo minorities is not an achievable goal for 
the near future. On the other hand, there are some who support the explanation that the 
existing conditions in Kosovo are caused by the delay in the decision for a final status.116 
They support the policy “standards with status,” whereby a decision for the status must 
be taken and, simultaneously, the PSIG will establish certain standards for all the 
ethnicities in Kosovo to solve the problem as fast as possible. The eruption of violence in 
March 2004 demonstrated that Kosovo society is not ready yet for that step. In the 
implementation of such a policy there is no leverage of pressure for the Kosovar 
Albanians except the intervention again of the international community. Decision makers, 
for that reason, have to be careful and patient. The critical point is that the reconstruction 
of society must be done correctly, not fast. The supervision and commitment of 
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international administrators is essential; there is a long way to go to accomplish the 
standards that were set by the UN. A failure in Kosovo will have serious consequences 
for the region and require further, and probably more, international administration. 
The characterization of the future status as “final” means that it should be long-
lasting and self-sustaining, without the supervision of international administrators. One 
necessary precondition for this accomplishment is that the status not provoke regional 
disorder or unstable situations. The term “Balkanization” is used to show a region’s 
multiple divisions.117 It derived from the complicated situation in the Balkans where so 
many nations and ethnic minorities exist that separation with borders is impossible. The 
fall of the Ottoman Empire created all the states that, after a series of wars, acquired  their 
contemporary borders. The ethnic map of the Balkans is also complicated because of the 
differences among the states based on historical, nationalist, religious, and cultural 
reasons.118 The borders were drawn after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire 
according to the interests of the so-called Great Powers,119 not according to the 
composition nationally of the population. The problem is that, according to Western 
liberal values, self-determination is the basic principle in the state-making process.  Thus, 
two conflicting factors—self-determination according to nationality and the drawing of 
borders according to the conflicting interests of the Great Powers—created the present 
unstable situation in the Balkans. 
B.  NATIONALISM IN THE BALKANS
Nationalism is the leading ideology in the Balkans. It is the basis of all the 
conflicts in the Balkans and the basis for the liberation of all states after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire.  The word “nation” derives from the ancient Latin word natio, which 
originally meant “birth” or “descent” as a distinctive feature of groups of all kind.120 
Renan concludes that a nation is a soul, a mental principle. Two things that are one and 
the same constitute this principle. One of them is a storm of memories; the other is a 
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currently valid agreement, a wish, to live together. A nation, then, is an extended 
community with a peculiar sense of kinship sustained by an awareness of the sacrifices 
that have been made in the past, and the sacrifices the nation is prepared to make in the 
future. A nation presumes a past, but the past is summed up in one tangible fact: the 
agreement, the desire, to continue a life in common. 
Nationalism as a predominant ideology spread in Europe during the last two 
centuries. In particular, nationalism’s roots are in the industrialization and urbanization in 
1882, when people started to participate in the political process. The majority of the 
newly established states after the end of the Cold War have their roots in nationalism. 
The idea of nation, as it was shaped in the nineteen century, changed the people’s idea 
about their territory. The nation occupies the territory, not the King. The idea of popular 
sovereignty transformed the people’s idea and sovereignty became his or her political 
entity. This in turn created a need for distinguishing mechanisms—the borders— for its 
defense.121
The idea of nation also had consequences in the perception of the change of status 
of a particular territory. The loss of a French province from Germany in the eighteenth 
century did not mean anything, but in 1871 it was a national tragedy and humiliation. The 
same reason is used today by the Serbs about Kosovo. The loss of part of the territory 
became the basis for future wars to restore national integrity and pride, especially when 
that territory had so important a meaning for both the Serbs and the Albanians.122   
C.  STATE CREATION 
The meaning of borders is important in Kosovo’s case because the decision about 
its final status comprises two main options: to keep or not to keep the existing borders. 
Another dimension of the meaning of borders is the change of philosophy in the post-
Westphalian world.  Its characteristic is the recognition of sovereign states as the main 
actors in an international system.123 This idea is used by Serbs to de-legitimize the 
Kosovar Albanians’ claims. Kosovo’s case is a challenge of the sovereignty of a state by 
a portion of its population with a different nationality that has resulted in international 
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intervention in favor of the suppressed minority. United Nations Resolution 1244 is 
ambiguous because, although it supports the territorial integrity of the FRY, it turned 
Kosovo into a UN protectorate and Serbia has no authority, in reality, there.  
The recognition of a state has different stages and criteria, depending on 
international circumstances and trends. After the end of World War I, the criteria for the 
recognition of a state (especially those that arose from the disintegration of old empires) 
were a democratic constitution and the guarantee of the human rights of all people—  
consequently, all minorities—that existed in the sovereignty of the state.124 Those criteria 
changed after World War II. The new criteria were clearly established boundaries, an 
administration capable of governing the state, institutions for the provision of security 
(external and internal), justice within the society, and institutions for the manifesting of 
public opinion.125 The collapse of the Soviet Union changed again the criteria for 
international recognition of all those states which were created from the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. There was a return to the criteria of 1919 
(democratic institutions and protection of minorities and human rights), with the addition 
of economic institutions for free markets. 
Before all possible scenarios are discussed, it is necessary to emphasize that the 
maintenance of a state is as important as its sovereignty.126 The ability of the PISG to 
govern an independent state is ambiguous. Basic aspects such as security and the 
economy are not self-sustaining and international aid is necessary for Kosovo’s survival. 
Moreover, respect for human rights and free movement requires UN supervision for at 
least this generation. Memories of the past are too strong for reconciliation in the next 
few years. The potential new state will be too weak and its ability for the provision of 
basic services is doubtful. The creation of another weak state with a multi-ethnic society 
and a “capacity and legitimacy gap”127 probably will cause new conflicts and instability  
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in the region. In addition, it is necessary to keep in mind that a weak state is a potential 
source of drugs and small-arms trade and terrorism, and a general threat to international 
security and stability. 
D.  FUTURE SCENARIOS 
All options that will be described are based on the assumption that the main 
involved actors are the Serbs, the Kosovar Albanians, and the international community 
represented by the UNMIK. The two opposing sides until now have kept a hard line as 
both refused to make any compromises and neither seemed to truly have intentions that 
would lead to a sustainable result. The Serbs cannot accept an independent Kosovo, for 
historical, economic, and strategic reasons. They realize that a return of Kosovo to its 
previous status (before 1999) is not possible, so they now discuss its “cantonization.” On 
the other hand, the Kosovar Albanians, backed by Albania, will not be satisfied with 
anything less than full independence, as they have adopted the principle of self-
determination and 90 percent of Kosovo’s population is Albanian.  Their further 
aspiration is to join with Albania because the next step after the independence of Kosovo 
for nationalistic reasons is the rejoining of the entire nation. Finally, the international 
community, although it supports the territorial integrity of Serbia,128 some argue that its 
actions and incentives intend the de facto independence of Kosovo. In addition to all 
these scenarios, it is clear to all sides that Kosovo will be too weak to survive on its own 
as an independent state and will need international help for its survival. A possible failure 
of the international community encloses many threats. A possible “governance gap” will 
create conditions for the entrance of more destabilizing factors. Many Muslim countries 
provide help in areas where the population is dissatisfied with Western aid. They link 
anti-Western ideologies with local concerns about being isolated from the rest of Europe. 
The Saudi Joint Committee for the Relief of Kosovo and Chechnya (SJCRKC) has been 
the most visible of these organizations. The SJCRKC’s success in Kosovo is attributable 
to its monopoly on the distribution of Kosovars’ daily needs, such as food, clothing, and 
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Thriving in Kosovo’s devastated rural areas, where the adult male 
population in particular was targeted by Serb forces during the 1990s, 
organizations operating under the SJCRKC’s umbrella have not only 
monopolized food and health supplies to the population, but also 
education. In this sense, the conditions in rural Kosovo resemble those 
observed along the Afghan border in the 1980s and early 1990s, when 
large numbers of families were also dependent on Saudi “charity.” Indeed, 
the mechanics of the Taliban phenomenon in Pakistan find many parallels 
in rural Kosovo—parallels that should alarm policymakers as the SJCRKC 
extends its influence in the region.129
All the possible scenarios will be examined according to their consequences for 
the Balkans’ stability. Almost all countries in the region have ethnic minorities and the 
final decision for Kosovo will work as the leading example of a change of the existing 
status, with a further consequence being the possible destabilization of the area.  
Especially in FYROM, where there is a large Albanian minority and the capacity of the 
state is limited, the danger of disintegration is serious. The possible independence of 
Kosovo (in any form) will create the same expectations in the Albanian minority, with 
significant consequences to FYROM’s stability and, consequently, in the entire region.  
First, all scenarios will be examined in which there is no change of the 
contemporary formal borders because they will cause less instability in the region than 
those with a change of borders. For the estimation of regional stability, I will take into 
consideration the social  and economic conditions of the neighboring states and their 
commonality with those in Kosovo, the possible necessary movement of minorities, and 
the possible involvement of other countries in case of instability. 
1. Scenario No 1: Kosovo Remains an International Protectorate Till the 
Full Membership of Serbia in the European Union 
In this scenario an important role must be played by the European Union (EU). 
Everyone agrees that international aid and supervision will have to remain in Kosovo. 
The United States, as required by the international conditions (the war on terror in Iraq 
and Afghanistan), will decrease its presence in the Balkans. Consequently, the only 
international organization capable of supervising Kosovo is the European Union. It has to 
“enforce” Serbia to be integrated into the Western structure and to become a full member. 
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UNMIK will continue its administration in Kosovo as long as necessary with no change 
of the present status, and the PISG will continue their efforts for the achievement of the 
Kosovo Standards Implementation Program. The status of issues like sovereignty, 
independence, or UN membership will remain as they are.  The final goal will be the 
entrance of Serbia as a full member into the European Union. Then the UN will hand 
over Kosovo’s supervision to the EU. 
Serbia’s full membership will be the catalyst for the decision of Kosovo’s final 
political status because it will be difficult for Kosovo’s self-government to insist on full 
independence and exodus from the European Union. As was mentioned, Kosovo will still 
be a very weak state and need international aid for its development and survival. 
However, almost every state in the Balkans strives for integration into Western structures 
and full membership in the European Union. The demand for exodus from the European 
Union by Kosovar Albanians has no basis and will have serious consequences in terms of 
the international aid that they will ask for in the future. Moreover, Albania must stop its 
support of the secession demands of the Kosovar Albanians. A more responsible position 
taken by Albania will help solve the problem and make it easier for Kosovo to achieve 
the standards set by the United Nations. The resulting stability will help not only 
Kosovo’s development but also the entire region’s economic prosperity and wealth. 
In addition, the acceptance of Serbia into the EU means that its government will 
have achieved certain standards in its economic sector and a level of democratic 
governance that guarantees respect for human rights and the economic prosperity of the 
country. Furthermore, it will then be easier for Serbia to accept the of autonomy of 
Kosovo within the European Union.  
The European Union is concerned about the conditions in the Balkans and has in 
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development and acceptance of Balkan states into the European Union will help stabilize 
the region and help states avoid the influence from countries that would only increase the 
instability.131  
a. Consequences for Regional Stability  
The situation will remain relatively unstable, as it is today, but as time 
passes the development and democratization in Serbia and Kosovo will be more 
consolidated.  The desired standards will be achieved, and it is expected that tensions will 
be less than today.  
Many support the belief that as long as Kosovo’s final status remains 
undecided, Albanians will be disappointed and that will create new tensions between the 
Kosovar Albanians and the international community. But this opinion is expressed mostly 
by the supporters of Kosovo’s full independence. On the other hand, if the PISG succeed 
in their effort for democratization and development, people will think more about the 
benefits of their situation and the improvement in their lives, and not about how to kill 
each other.   
Another positive factor of this scenario is that neighboring countries will 
not be affected by the new situation. Their stability will remain as it is now or it may 
improve as they continue their efforts for democratization and integration into Western 
structures. 
2. Scenario No 2: Kosovo Remains a Serbian Province with an 
Autonomous Status 
This scenario is what the Serbs want, but they know that this solution is too 
difficult, even though they have taken some considerable steps toward democratization 
and probably will avoid the mistakes of the past. It would be impossible, however, for the 
Kosovar Albanians to accept Serbian rule, especially after what has happened since 
 
131 Stability Pact for Southern Eastern Europe: The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was 
adopted in Cologne. In the founding document, more than 40 partner countries and organizations undertook 
to strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe “in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for 
human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region.” Euro-Atlantic 
integration was promised to all the countries in the region, 10 Jun 1999. 
45 
                                                
1989.132 They would react violently to this option and the international community, after 
its intervention, would find it impossible to let Kosovo return to its previous status. The 
only hope is the democratization of Serbia and Kosovo so they can cooperate at the 
governmental level, because memories of the Serbs’ behavior, at least since 1998, are 
difficult for Kosovar Albanians to forget and vice versa.  
a. Consequences for Regional Stability  
The Albanians’ reaction would be considerable and probably new 
disorders would erupt. The international community, as was proved in the violent events 
of March 2004, would need reinforcement to handle the disorder. A new intervention 
would favor the Serbs, as the Albanians would reject this option and the situation would 
be very complicated. The result would be a return to the initial point of June 1999. This 
scenario would possibly not affect minorities in neighboring countries. 
3. Scenario No 3: Cantonization/Decentralization133
The next option is the creation of Serb enclaves in Kosovo’s territory that would 
be governed by them without any change in current borders.  The Serbs’ boycotting of 
the last elections points to this option. It would, however, have negative consequences for 
the region as it would set a precedent for minorities in neighboring countries, who might 
then ask for the same status. On the other hand, Albanians do not accept this scenario 
because it constitutes de facto recognition of Yugoslav authority in these Serbian 
enclaves.134 This option is a similar situation to that that Serbia faced when the Kosovar 
Albanians were asking for autonomy.   
a. Consequences for Regional Stability  
This option would probably spark similar scenarios in every multi-ethnic 
society in the region. Every country in the region with an ethnic minority—FYROM, 
 
132 “In the wake of what Bernard Kouchner, the head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, has described as 
‘forty years of communism, ten years of apartheid, and a year of ethnic cleansing,’ peace-building in 
Kosovo is an exceptionally difficult and long-term task. Military victory was but the first step on a long 
road to building a durable, multi-ethnic society free from the threat of renewed conflict.” 1 Feb 2005. Last 
accessed 14 Mar 2005, from http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/kosovo.htm 
133 The Prime Minister of Serbia on 2 March 2004 presented in the parliament a programme for 
Kosovo’s cantonization: “the solution, if there is still time for one, must include some autonomy inside 
Kosovo for majority-Serbian regions and the most sacred Serbian holy sites, which together comprise about 
a quarter of Kosovo.” 
134 United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 91, Kosovo Final Status: Options and Cross-
Border Requirements, p. 7. 
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Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina—might well face the same problem because every minority 
group would ask for the same status.  The dominant states would not accept such a 
change of Kosovo’s status without considerable reaction, and the danger of their 
disintegration would be evident. Any chance of a sustainable peace would be lost, and the 
international community again would be called upon to intervene to solve the differences. 
Thus there would be an increase of its presence instead of the opposite. 
This is especially true in FYROM where there are ethnic minorities,135 the 
majority Albanian, and that relatively weak state would be in danger of disintegration. If 
that happened, its Albanian minority would join with the “motherland,” Albania, and 
aspirations for a Greater Albania would be rekindled. The danger of intervention by 
neighboring countries is also a factor that would cause instability in the entire region. 
Even if this did not happen, a new wave of refugees to neighboring countries would be 
created and the danger for instability in the region would be increased. 
4. Scenario No 4: A Commonwealth136
In this scenario, Kosovo would function as an independent state with separate UN 
membership but Serbia would keep nominal sovereignty. This option would satisfy 
Serbia as the borders would remain the same, there would be a connection between 
Serbia and Kosovo, and Serbia would have separate representation in the UN. The 
combination of this option with the second one, cantonization, would create a preferable 
scenario for the Serbs. 
On the other hand, the Kosovar Albanians would be satisfied with the separate 
membership in the UN, but they would disagree with Serbian nominal sovereignty and 
cantonization. Another necessary condition would be the improvement of relations 
between Pristina and Belgrade, otherwise it could not exist as a commonwealth. 




135 Macedonian 64.2%, Albanian 25.2%, Turkish 3.8%, Roma 2.7%, Serb 1.8%, other 2.3% (2002).  
US Central Intelligence Agency. Last accessed 14 Mar 2005, from http://www.cia.gov/
136 United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 91: Kosovo Final Status, Options, and Cross-
Border Requirements, p. 9. 
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a. Consequences for Regional Stability  
As long as the formal Serbian borders remain as they are, the region would 
be relatively stable, although some extreme elements in every minority might believe that 
this was the next step to the full independence of Kosovo and, consequently, would keep 
their hopes up for their own independence. Refugees would be unlikely to return if there 
was no combination with cantonization. The international community would have to 
ensure their security and safe living conditions. 
There are additional scenarios for a final-status solution without a change 
of current borders, but all of them are based on the four scenarios already discussed. The 
following scenarios have as a precondition a change of borders. Within these options lies 
hidden the danger of destabilization of the region. 
5. Scenario No 5: Full Independence of Kosovo with Partition137
In this scenario, Kosovo would gain its independence without the Serb-dominated 
north and north Mitrovica (north of the Ibar River).138  This option raises questions, 
however, about the luck of Serbs in southern Kosovo (about 50,000) and the Albanians in 
the southern part of Serbia. For Serbs, partition may be the only acceptable way for 
Kosovo to be independent, as all agree that Serbs cannot be “ruled over” by Albanians.139 
On the other hand, Albanians, in the name of independence, would probable accept 
partition. But until now, both sides have maintained a hard line and refused to 
compromise for a solution.  
a. Consequences for Regional Stability  
The consequences of a secession of Kosovo would be the same but even 
worse than those of cantonization (option 2). Countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
FYROM, and Serbia would face a danger of internal disorder from their different ethnic 
minorities. And again, aspiration for a Greater Albania would be raised. Some pessimists 
believe that Albania, in the name of a Greater Albania, might claim territories from 
Greece and support a partition of the Albanian minority in FYROM. The possible 
                                                 
137 United States Institute of Peace, p. 13. 
138 On 29 April the Serbian Parliament approved an elaborate plan for the territorial autonomy of 
Serbs in Kosovo. European Stability Initiative. The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory, and the 
Future of Kosovo’s Serbs.  Berlin/Pristina, 7 Jun 2004. Last accessed 14 Mar 2005, from www.esiweb.org 
139 Ibid. 
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involvement of Greece in the dispute would probably cause Turkey to intervene on 
Albania’s side, which would result in a new Balkan war. Even if this did not happen, all 
the various minorities would claim their independence in keeping with the principle of 
self-determination. Weak states like FYROM have no capacity for yet another partition, 
and destabilization of the entire region would result. 
A tragic dimension of this scenario would be the internally displaced 
people (IDP) (about 200,000).140 The Serbs who live in the southern part of Kosovo 
would be in danger of “ethnic cleansing” in the case of independence, and they would be 
forced to move to safer places, like northern Kosovo. The same is possible for the 
Albanians who live in southern Serbia. An international presence would be necessary to 
support those population movements.  
6. Scenario No 6: An Independent Kosovo with the Province’s Current 
Borders  
According to this sixth scenario, the Kosovar Albanians would get what they want 
after so many years of fighting: the full independence of the province. This option again 
raises many questions, however, about Kosovo’s ability to survive on its own, and about 
the security of minorities, the regional stability, and the role of an international 
administration in this state.  
The present situation in Kosovo has proved that the PISG does not have the 
ability to provide security for the people who live there. There are no armed forces for 
external security and the Kosovo Police Corps (KPC) proved incapable (or on some 
occasions unwilling)141 to protect minorities in the violent events of March 2004. This 
service is now provided by international forces and in the case of independence this 
situation would be continued. The only other possibility would be Kosovo’s annexation 
to Albania, something opposite to the will of the international community because of the 
consequences in other countries, especially the FYROM, which would be very 
destructive. 
 
140 The Lausanne Principle, p. 13. 
141 “In some cases, KPS officers did little if anything to protect Serbs under attack.” Human Rights 
Watch. Last accessed 14 Mar 2005, from 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/7.htm#_Toc77665984. 
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Another issue would be that of the minorities who live in Kosovo. Internal 
security institutions have also proved to be insufficient for the establishment of the rule of 
law. Again, KFOR is responsible, as was proved after the March 2004 violence when 
KFOR received a great amount of criticism for its failure to handle those events,142 and 
not the KPC. The present conditions do not provide much hope for the peaceful 
coexistence of all minorities in Kosovo. This is the reason for enforcement by the 
international community of the “Kosovo Standards Implementation Program.” Serbs will 
not discuss this option and the international community till now has not wanted a 
separation of Kosovo from Serbia. 
The reaction of minorities in neighboring countries is another issue that must be 
taken into consideration when discussing the sixth option. There is an Albanian minority 
in FYROM with similar aspirations and a possible independent Kosovo would ignite new 
disorder in that country. 
The reasonable solution of all these issues is that international supervision would 
remain the in the region with no change of the present status. 
a. Consequences for Regional Stability  
The consequences for regional stability would be the same as those in the 
previous scenario, independence with partition, or even worse. All the minorities would 
demand the same status in the name of self-determination, and Kosovo’s case would be 
the model for their demands.  
There is also a scenario for joining independent Kosovo with its 
“motherland,” Albania, a logical consequence after the determination of Kosovo’s final 
status, if as an independent state.  
In all the above scenarios there is a common factor: international 
supervision and administration would have to remain in the region because the potential 
new state would be too weak to survive on its own. There are also many details to be 
worked out about the free movement of people, the relations between Pristina and 
 
142 “Although international officials have been outspoken in their criticism of the Kosovar leadership 
for its failings during the crisis, they have not shown a similarly critical attitude in evaluating the failures of 
their own organizations and institution.” Human Rights Watch, Failure to Protect: UNMIK and KFOR’s 
Inability to Protect Serbs and Other Minorities. Last accessed 14 Mar 2005, from 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/6.htm  
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Belgrade, and other cross-border issues. The basic precondition for a successful 
arrangement of these issues is a dialogue between the two communities; otherwise, 
sooner or later conflict will erupt again.  
In conclusion, the present situation in Kosovo does not provide much hope 
for the near future, although there are many who believe that the present situation is a 
result of its undecided political status, and that, when that status is decided, development 
will be achieved. They believe that the stability of the state would encourage investments. 
Most of them support the solution of an independent Kosovo, ignoring the consequences 
for the region and Kosovo’s incapability of self-sustainment. 
Kosovo’s circumstances have deep roots in nationalism and history. It is 
difficult for Kosovar Albanians to convince the international community that they can 
provide a long-standing solution and create a self-sustainable state. The survival of this 
state depends on international aid and supervision. The recent violent events in March 
2004 proved that five years from the end of the bombing, and three years after the 
creation of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, Kosovo still has a long way 
to go to achieve an acceptable level of quality-of-life. Kosovo society, in aspects such as 
security, the economy, and justice, is not self-sustainable, and the creation of another 
weak state would only increase the current uncertainty in the Balkans. The absence of 
international administrators would probably create chaos in Kosovo and instability in the 
region, and would permit influence by Muslim countries from the Middle East (e.g., 
Saudi Arabia) with further consequences for international security. 
The international community, on the other hand, recognizes that a new 
state with the conditions that exist in Kosovo would put the entire region in danger. 
United Nations Resolution 1244 is ambiguous: the solution is not easy and needs more 
time. The United Nations is an international organization based on the post-Westphalia 
concept of the state as primer actor in the international system. However, UN 
intervention in Kosovo resulted in its transformation to a UN protectorate and the loss of 
every legitimate right of Serbians in the province. On the other hand, the same resolution 
mentions support for Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.  
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All possible scenarios for Kosovo’s final political status are focused in 
two basic solutions: an independent Kosovo, or not. A more general approach to this 
problem may lead to a solution. The importance of respect for human rights, 
development, and democratization must refer to all the Balkan states, not just Kosovo or 
FYROM. The effort to solve only Kosovo’s situation will create further problems for the 
FYROM and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, all these states want to enter the European 
Union. There is no rationale for creating new weak states and new efforts to develop 
them and integrate them into Western structures. The EU has an active and “coercive” 
strategy for all the Balkan countries, given their present status, to join the European 
Union.143  
There are many scenarios for Kosovo’s future, but for the moment, all of 
them agree on the necessity for an international administration of aid and supervision. All 
the factors lead to the conclusion that keeping UN supervision and international aid until 
the achievement of certain standards is necessary. Serbia after Milosevic’s fall has begun 
a democratization process. The European Union has to “seek” both for the Balkans’ 
stability144 and Serbia’s acceptance as a full member. The provision of aid in Serbia for 
its integration into Western structures and its membership in the European Union will 
make it easier to solve the Kosovo problem. Demands for certain standards—of the 
economy, democracy, human rights, and freedom in movement—from the European 
Union will ensure the required standards also in Kosovo.  The achievement of these 
standards should be easier in Serbia than in Kosovo, so it will take less time for its 
problem’s solution. It will not be easy for Kosovar Albanians to keep asking for their 
independence, which in this case will mean first an exodus from the European Union and 
then asking for international help for their further development and reintegration into the 
European Union or other Western structure as an independent state. On the other hand, 
under these conditions it will be easier for Serbia to accept some kind of independence or 
autonomy for Kosovo.  
Albania also has an important role to play. It has a direct link with the 
Kosovar Albanians, so it must show that it works for regional stability and wants 
 
143 Stability Pact for Southern Eastern Europe. 
144 This is the reason for the creation of the Stability Pact for the Southern Europe. 
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development for Kosovo and the entire region. A responsible and mature Albania would 
be more easily integrated into the Western world. Another positive aspect of this scenario 
is that all neighboring countries would remain stable and would strive for their own 
development and democratization and for integration into the European Union.  
E.  CONCLUSION 
Kosovo’s status will remain undecided for some years to come because it is not 
ready for any kind of independence or autonomy. Moreover, it is not possible for it to 
return to the status it had before March 1999. All the above scenarios show the need for a 
longer stay of the international community in the region. The need for development and 
democratization is the basic goal of UNMIK and the PISG. This is the reason for the 
implementation of the Kosovo Standards Implementation Program (KSIP). The 
significance of this program is its enforcement of the PISG’s achievement of 
predetermined standards in sectors such as governance, democracy, justice, economy, and 
respect for the human rights of every ethnic group in Kosovo. Nationalism and recent 
memories from the Milosevic era are the main obstacles to reconciliation in Kosovo 
society. The PISG must prove that it is capable of establishing justice and reconciliation 
and is able to govern. The KSIP also will be used by the UN Security Council to measure 
and assess the PISG’s progress in meeting the desired standards.145
Serbia must be “driven” to the European Union. That could be a catalyst not only 
in the decision of Kosovo’s status but also for the entire region’s stability. Serbia’s 
membership in the EU would guarantee all of the standards required for the development 
of the country—including Kosovo. On the other hand, the Kosovar Albanians would get 
a kind of independence that would satisfy them. A sustainable peace and integration in 
Europe can be achieved only when both sides realize that their development depends on 




145 M2 Presswire Coventry UN: Security Council reiterates that Kosovo Standards Plan should be 
basis for assessing provisional institutions of self-government; In Presidential Statement, Council Also 
‘Strongly Urges’ Provisional Institutions to Demonstrate Full Commitment to Multi-Ethnic Kosovo. 3 May 




The end of the bombing in June 1999 and the arrival of an international 
administration created big expectations among the Kosovar Albanians: they thought that 
the time for their independence had arrived. The subsequent years proved very difficult, 
however, and the final political status of Kosovo six years later remains undecided. 
The international community soon realized that it would not be an easy task to 
implement a solution. The area was devastated from the bombings and from conflicts 
between Serbs and Albanians. The need for reconstruction was crucial. Security was a 
difficult task and only now is the environment relatively secure. In the area of governance 
the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, in the beginning, held all the 
power, but as the situation improved, he passed some authorities to the PISG. In the 
economic sector much more is needed: unemployment is the highest in Europe and the 
population is the youngest, a combination that creates unstable conditions for the region. 
The judicial sector also needs improvement.  
Although Kosovo has achieved many things over the past six years, it needs more 
time to accomplish all the tasks that were set by the UN. Sectors such as security, 
governance, and justice need a lot of effort and time for the achievement of an acceptable 
level of the quality-of-life. Today Kosovo is incapable of surviving as an independent 
state and is unable to provide basics services to its residents. On the other hand, it is also 
impossible for Kosovo to return to its status of March 1999.  The peaceful coexistence of 
different minorities is possible only because of the presence of international security 
forces. Reconciliation among minorities in Kosovo also needs more time. Now 
international security forces are faced with a paradox. Six years ago they intervened to 
stop the ethnic cleansing of the Albanian minority in a province of a dominant Serbian 
state. Today, they have to protect the Serbian citizens of this state from the Albanian 
minority, the majority in the province of Kosovo. Their hope is that short-time 
reconciliation will prevail. It is difficult for people who were fighting each other some 
years ago, and who probably are responsible for deaths in the families of their neighbors, 
to live together in harmony. 
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On the other hand, most of the Balkan states face the same problems as Kosovo. 
The conflict between liberal ideas and self-determination, on the one hand, and 
maintaining formal borders and the stability of the region on the other hand creates a very 
dangerous situation in the Balkans. Poor economies, ethnic minorities with aspirations for 
secession and the creation of a Greater Albania and Serbia, and the status of weak states 
are the main characteristics of the Balkans. The solution in Kosovo will probably be a 
leading example for regional ethnic minorities, with many undesired consequences for 
the region’s stability.   
The Balkans’ stability will be heavily influenced by Kosovo’s final status. Its 
population of about two million includes eight ethnic and religious minorities. An 
independent Kosovo would be incapable of adapting all these people to a state with 
democratic principles, respect for human rights, and economic wealth. Nationalism still 
influences relations among the citizenry, and the high unemployment adds to the 
increasing instability of the region. Whatever Kosovo’s final status, it must contribute to 
its residents’ wealth, economic development, and peaceful coexistence.  
There are two basic choices for the final status of Kosovo: to change or not to 
change the current borders. The international community, with UN Resolution 1244, 
made clear its opposition to any change of Serbia’s borders. Moreover, it is obvious that 
an international administration and aid is necessary in Kosovo. Due to international 
conditions the United States withdrew its forces from the region. Consequently, it is time 
for the European Union to play a role in Kosovo. The enforcement of development in 
Serbia will have faster results than that in Kosovo. The acceptance of Serbia as a full 
member of the EU will help solve this problem. International supervision would remain 
and the EU would guarantee certain standards of democracy, economic prosperity, and 
justice in both Serbia and Kosovo.  
Moreover, this scenario would not unduly influence the fragile stability; to the 
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